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OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL: EXISTING REGIME AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Norman A. Wulf* 
Abstract 
The existing arms control regime for 
outer space bans attacks on satellites of 
other countries, except as acts of self-
defense. The moon and other celestial 
bodies cannot be used for military activi-
ties. Detonating nuclear explosives in 
outer space is prohibited. Deployment in 
space of nuclear weapons or other weapons 
of mass destruction is prohibited. Devel-
opment, testing, or deployment of space-
based anti-ballistic systems or their com-
ponents by the United States or the Soviet 
Union is prohibited. 
Proposals that outer space be demili-
tarized or that anti-satellite weapons be 
banned create complex problems. Since all 
space activities have potential military 
uses, great care would have to be taken in 
defining precisely what a proposal to 
demilitarize space is meant to prohibit. 
Similarly, many space objects have the 
capability to be used to damage or destroy 
space objects. Any reasonable definition 
of anti-satellite weapon will leave uncon-
trolled some non-weapon systems that have 
a residual anti-satellite capability. 
Daunting problems of verification and the 
disparity between the current relevant 
space capabilities of the United States and 
the Soviet Union add further complexity. 
While it is unreasonable to conclude 
that demilitarization of space or a ban on 
ASAT weaponry are panaceas, it is also un-
reasonable to conclude that nothing useful 
can be done in space arms control. 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to summarize the 
existing legal regime for arms control in 
outer space and thereafter to comment on 
some factors that influence the prospects 
for new arms control constraints. It will 
be seen that a fairly extensive legal 
regime for arms control in outer space 
already exists. It will also be seen that 
factors influencing future outer space arms 
control prospects are quite complex. 
I. The Existing Regime 
A. Protection of Satellites 
A basic proposition is that under 
existing international law no country can 
damage,-destroy or forcibly interfere with 
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the satellites of another country, except 
when engaged in individual or collective 
self-defense. While this rule is not 
stated explicitly in existing international 
law, it is nonetheless implicitly and 
clearlr set forth in the Outer Space 
Treaty and the UN Charter. 
Let us begin our examination with 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. It 
states in pertinent part: 
Outer space '" shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States 
without discrimination of any 
kind, on a basis of equality and 
in accordance with international 
law .... 
The basic law applicable to outer space is 
set forth in this article -- outer space 
is open to all States for use and explora-
tion. Destroying a satellite operated by 
a foreign state violates this basic right 
by depriving that State of the use of 
outer space. 
Of course, all rights are subject to 
certain limitations and this right is no 
exception. Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty states in part: 
States Parties to the Treaty ... 
shall conduct all their activi-
ties in outer space ... with 
due regard to the corresponding 
interests of all other States 
Parties to the Treaty .... 
This limitation is an obvious one. If one 
State in exercising its freedom to use 
outer space conducts space activities in 
total disregard of the space activities 
conducted by another State, the latter 
State's freedom to use space may be in-
fringed. Obviously, States in exercising 
their outer space freedom must take 
account of the freedom sought to be exer-
cised by other states. 
It is worth pausing a moment to look 
at the antecedents of this rule. An 
analogous area in which a well-defined body 
of law had been developed prior to the 
Outer Space Treaty negotiations is the law 
of the sea. Indeed, the negotiators of 
the Outer Space Treaty have acknowledged 
their 2debt to this body of law and prac-tice. Perhaps best reflective of the 
customary rules of law of the sea was th3 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 
Article 2 of that Convention sets forth the 
basic high seas rule: 
The high seas being open to all 
nations, no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of 
them to its sovereignty. Freedom 
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of the high seas is exercised 
under the conditions laid down 
by these articles and by the 
other rules of international 
law. It comprises, inter alia, 
both for coastal and non-
coastal States: 
[Freedom of navigation, fishing, 
overlight and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines.) 
These freedoms and others which 
are recognized by the general 
principles of international 
law, shall be exercised by all 
States with reasonable regard 
to the interests of other 
States in their exercise of 
the freedom of the high seas. 
This basic rule has operated as 4the peace-time law for several centuries. With 
little more, this concept has allowed for 
the use of the seas by all States with the 
understanding that interference with the 
activities of others is to be avoided. In 
short, the same basic rule that for centu-
ries protected foreign ships from harm was 
placed in the Outer Space Treaty and now 
protects foreign satellites from harm. 
Law of the sea rules, however, re-
quired that jurisdiction over ships on the 
high seas be assigned to some State. That 
State is the State whosesflag the ship 
flies -- the flag State. The Outer Space 
Treaty specifies that the State Party "on 
whose registry an object launched into 
outer space is carried" -- the registry 
State -6 has jurisdiction over the space 
object. Traditional maritime rules did 
not readily transfer to space since an 
unmanned ship on the high seas would be 
considered abandoned and a legitimate 
object of salvage. To prevent any concept 
of salvage applying to unmanned orbiting 
satellites, Article VIII makes clear that 
Ownership of objects launched 
into outer space, including 
objects landed or constructed 
on a celestial body, and of 
their component parts, is not 
affected by their presence in 
outer space or on a celestial 
body or by their return to 
the Earth. 
Thus, the Outer Space Treaty firmly estab-
lishes that jurisdiction over a space 
object is vested in the registry State and 
that objects in space are not to be viewed 
as abandoned or subject to salvage or 
interference by other States. To summarize 
the rules thus far, all States are free to 
use outer space but they must do so with 
regard to the use of space by others. The 
fact that an object is in outer space does 
not alter its ownership; jurisdiction over 
the space object shall be in the registry 
State. 
Were the analysis to be stopped at 
this point, some doubt arguably might 
exist about protection accorded space ob-
jects. Those doubts would be dispelled, 
however, by Article III of the Outer Space 
Treaty. It imposes an obligation on State 
Parties to conduct their space activities 
"in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations." 
While the applicability of the Charter to 
man's activities in space had been presumed 
by many, this provis~on made its applica-
bility clear to all. The intricacies of 
the Charter are beyond the scope of this 
paper. Suffice it for me to state that 
the Charter's proscription on the "threat 
or use of force", except when an act of 
individual or collective self-defense, 
applies to space objects -- space objects 
whose ownership is not subject to question 
as a result of Article VIII of the Outer 
Space Treaty and whose right to be present 
in space is clearly established by Article 
I of the Treaty. 
While it may have been preferable that 
the Outer Space Treaty state explicitly 
that space objects of a State shall not be 
damaged or destroyed by other States, 
there can be no question that the combined 
effect of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
UN Charter is to provide such protection. 
There is, therefore, a peacetime legal 
regime in place that implicitly precludes 
a State from damaging or destroying 
satellites of other States. 
B. Prohibition of Certain Acts or Weapons 
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Having established that a principle 
component of the existing arms control 
regime for outer space is the implicit pro-
tection of satellites, this analysis now 
examines other features of the existing 
regime, specifically those rules prohibit-
ing certain acts and those rules prohibit-
ing certain weapons. 
Traditional law of the sea rules pro-
hibit two activities explicitly -- slave 
trading and piracy. What of outer space? 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty places 
explicit prohibitions on military activi-
ties on celestial bodies: 
The moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be used by all State Parties 
to the Treaty exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. The estab-
lishment of military bases, 
installations and fortifications, 
the testing of any type of weapons 
and the conduct of military man-
euvers on celestial bodies shall 
be forbidden. 
This prohibition is patterned after Arti-
cle I of the Antarctic Treaty that pro-
hibited migitary activities on that frozen 
continent. 
Although some have made arguments to 
the contrary, it is clear that the Outer 
Space Treaty does not prohibit military 
activities conducted elsewhere in outer 
space than on the moon and other celestial 
bodies. Thus, there is no overall prohibi-
tion on military activities conducted in 
Earth orbit. The practice of both major 
space powers sUbstantiates this. 
Limitations are in place with respect 
to certain weapon systems, particularly 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction. The 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty prohibits detonating a Yijclear ex-
plosive device in outer space. The 
Outer Space Treaty, some four years later, 
prohibited placing nuclear weapons "or any 
other kin~s of weapons otlmass destruction" 
anywhere In outer space. Weapons of mass 
destruction include radiological, chemical 
and biological weapons and any weapons 
developed in the future which have charac-
teristics comparable in destructive effect 
to those of nuclear wr2pons or other wea-
pons mentioned above. 
Beyond the nuclear realm but perhaps 
approximating their destructive effect is 
the ban on hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques. The EnMod Conven-
tion not only prohibits hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques in 
space that result in widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects on Earth but also 
such use !~at results in comparable effects 
on space. 
In the bilateral realm, the United 
States and the Soviet Union have agreed in 
the 1972 ABM Treaty not to develop, test, 
or deploy anti-ballist-ic missile sys!~ms 
or components which are space-based. 
The ABM Treaty, however, does not preclude 
research on such systems or components. 
From this brief overview the existing 
arms control regime for outer space can be 
summarized as follows: 
Damaging or destroying another 
State's satellites is prohibited except 
when an act of individual or collective 
self-defense; 
-- The moon and other celestial bodies 
shall not be used for military activities; 
-- Detonating nuclear explosives in 
outer space is prohibited; 
-- Deployment of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction in outer 
space is prohibited; and 
-- Development, testing, or deployment 
of space-based ABM systems or components by 
the United States or the Soviet Union is 
prohibited. 
II. Future Prospects 
There has been a great deal of atten-
tion given to possible further arms control 
measures applicable to outer space. Some 
call for a complete ban on all military 
activities in outer space -- demilitariza-
tion -- while others call for a ban on 
anti-satellite weapons. There are calls 
for other measures as well, but I shall 15 
confine myself to these two broad areas. 
A. Demilitarization of Outer Space 
The first problem to be overcome is a 
definitional one. What are military acti-
vities? Do they include military use of a 
communication satellite? A navigation 
satellite? Would such a ban extend to 
military use of maps prepared through use 
of remote sensing satellite imagery? In-
deed, would one go so far as to ban weather 
satellites because that information could 
assist the military? 
Or, perhaps at the other end of the 
spectrum, would this ban be limited to 
certain specific military actions? For 
example, the Outer Space Treaty explicitly 
prohibits placing on any celestial body 
"military bases, installations and forti-
fications." If this restriction were 
made applicable to Earth orbit, would the 
Soviet manned space station be a military 
base? After all, it is manned by Soviet 
military personnel. The response might 
well be, no, because use of military 
personnel does not automatically make the 
activity a military activity. Support for 
this view would be found in Article IV 
which, when talking about the prohibition 
on military activities conducted on 
celestial bodies, specifically allows mili-
tary to be used. So, the mere fact that 
the personnel on-board the spacecraft are 
military, some would assert, does not make 
that craft a military installation. 
Perhaps, the definitional problem 
could be reduced were military activities 
to be defined as referring to weapons or 
weapons systems. Thus, a military space-
craft would be a craft that has weapons 
on board -- an armed craft. The term 
"weapon", however, is not self-defining 
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and perhaps more specificity is needed here 
as well. Thus, it may be necessary to 
speak in terms of weapons with the capa-
bility to damage or destroy targets in 
space or targets on Earth or in the 
Earth's atmosphere. However, there are 
problems in doing this as well. 
What activities would such a defini-
tion exclude? A satellite that transmitted 
data to an Earth-based weapon system that 
used that data to target an Earth-based 
object would be excluded. If targeting 
satellites were to be included, the defini-
tion would have to cover not only those 
space objects that have weapon systems on 
board that are capable of damaging Earth 
targets but also it would have to cover 
space objects that assist Earth-based 
weapon systems to target Earth targets. 
How much assistance is enough? A naviga-
tional system that tells the weapon system 
with precision where it is located may 
assist that system in hitting its intended 
target. What about maps made from satel-
lite imagery? NOw, we are back to where we 
started when we were speaking of the gener-
ality of the phrase "demilitarization of 
space". 
To me the conclusion is obvious. All 
space activities have potential military 
uses. To seek to "demilitarize space" 
without a precise definition of what that 
means is to ban nothing or to ban every-
thing. Definitions are almost always 
arbitrary, excluding certain items and in-
cluding others. If an approach that banned 
certain weapons were to be pursued, great 
care would have to be taken to define what 
is prohibited. Parties to any such agree-
ment would have to accept that the arbit-
rary definition will exclude activities or 
systems that nonetheless have military 
implications -- how serious those implica-
tions are will vary depending not only upon 
the system themselves but also upon the 
perception of the party. 
Another issue that must be dealt with 
is verification. No party to an arms con-
trol agreement that deals with its funda-
mental national security interests can be 
expected to base compliance upon trust of 
the other party or parties. It is the 
lack of trust that leads to the arms the 
agreements seek to control. Each party 
must have the independent capability to 
determine for itself whether the others are 
complying with the agreement. While there 
can be dispute as to how much verification 
is necessary, there can be no dispute that 
trust alone is inadequate. 
Such verification activities could 
include the use of a variety of means 
ranging from observation satellites to 
review of the budgeting process and techni-
cal journals. The latter obviously is more 
available for use by the Soviet Union in 
verifying compliance by the United States 
than is available to the United States in 
verifying compliance by the Soviet Union. 
A more detailed discussion of verification 
is included in the following discussion 
of anti-satellite systems. 
B. Anti-Satellite Systems 
In the preceding section, reference 
was made to the peacetime rules established 
through the centuries for sea-going naviga-
tion -- freedom of the high seas combined 
with a due regard for the exercise by 
others. This basic regime did not prevail 
in war time nor did the existence of this 
rule prevent the development of vessels 
whose only practical use at that time was 
the destruction of vessels, i.e., the sub-
marine. Following World War I, the United 
States and Great Britain proposed that sub-
marines be abolished altogether. This 
proposal was not adopted but instead limi-
tations on their use were subsequently 
adopted at the London Naval Conference of 
1930. Those limitations did not survive 
World War II and now the use of submarines 
in times ~~ hostilities is an accepted 
practice. While fleets of commercial 
vessels ply the high seas on a routine 
basis, submarines capable of sinking 
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those fleets ply the depths as a deter-
rent to armed conflict and, if ~pterrence 
fails, as a means of destroying enemy 
warships and denying seaborne lines of 
communication. 
In space, a variety of satellites are 
pursuing their various activities pro-
tected by the peacetime rule of free use 
with a duty of due regard for other 
State's uses. These peacetime rules 
obviously would not protect all satellites 
during periods of conflict. Therefore, 
proposals to ban anti-satellite weapons 
have as their purpose not protection of 
satellites in peacetime but their prote-
ction during armed conflict. As with the 
proposal to ban submarines, the objective 
of such a ban on ASAT weapons would be to 
place a certain area or certain targets 
out of reach during a conflict by denying 
the sides the opportunity to develop and 
test ASAT weapons before hand. Another 
objective of a proposal to ban weapons 
for destroying satellites would be to 
avoid a racheting process of developing 
ASAT weapons and developing counters to 
such weapons. Achievement of these objec-
tives, however, is frought with difficul-
ties. Among them are problems of defini-
tion and verification. A separate problem 
is the applicability of such a ban during 
hostilities. 
The definitional problem is similar to 
that encountered in the examination of 
demilitarization and probably will re-
quire the same solution -- an arbitrary 
definition. For example, a satellite with 
a capability to maneuver could be used as 
a weapon if it is maneuvered into a colli-
sion course with another satellite. Simi-
larly, the docking of one satellite with 
another provides a capability that also 
could be used to maneuver a weapon close 
to the satellite of another country. How-
ever, banning satellites with the ability 
to maneuver or banning docking maneuvers 
would place an unreasonable burden on 
non-weapon uses of space. Another possi-
bility would be a missile fired straight 
up from the ground that detonates a con-
ventional or nuclear warhead in proximity 
to an orbiting satellite. Such ground 
launched missiles have, and will continue 
to have, important non-weapons uses so a 
ban on such missiles cannot be considered 
likely. Other examples could be given but 
the point is clear. It is not possible to 
eliminate all systems that have a capa-
bility to damage or destroy satellites. 
The focus, therefore, should be on systems 
dedicated to the damage or destruction of 
satellites or possibly on a discrete 
category of actions or hardware that have 
such distinct ASAT capability that the 
non-weapon use must be sacrificed. Such 
a sacrifice would only occur when the 
non-weapon use is not significant. 
Verifying whether a particular system 
is a dedicated ASAT weapon or a system 
that is engaged in non-weapon activities 
but has a residual ASAT capability is an 
obvious problem of extreme complexity. 
Even the technology and experience of 
approaching a foreign satellite for pur-
poses of verification paradoxically could 
also enhance ASAT capabilities. Moreover, 
a close approach would not always reveal 
cases whether a particular space object 
had a weapon on board. If further arms 
control agreements are to be pursued, 
great care will obviously have to be exer-
cised in defining their limits to ensure 
that they are verifiable. 
Another complicating factor relates 
to the role of arms control agreements 
during a period of armed hostilities. 
Some agreements denominated as Laws of 
War are designed to be an~7are applicable 
during armed hostilities. Others are 
clearly applicable during armed hostili-
ties, although not specifically desig-
nated as laws of war -- the Environmen!~l 
Modification Convention is an example. 
Many arms control agreements clearly are 
not applicable during armed hostilities. 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear 
explosions in the atmosphere but does not 
purport to preclude use o!9nuclear weapons 
during armed hostilities. It is doubt-
ful that either the Soviet Union or the 
U.S. expect bilateral arms control agree-
ments to be applicable during periods of 
armed hostilities between them. Given the 
nature of systems regulated and their pos-
sible use in a nuclear exchange, the pos-
sible non-applicability of the ABM Treaty 
during armed hostilities is probably of 
theoretical interest only. The adherence 
by either Party to their existing policies 
of interim restraint regarding the SALT I 
Interim Agreement and SALT II during a 
time of armed hostilities is probably even 
more theoretical. These agreements ob-
viously have as their primary purpose the 
reduction of the risk of armed hostilities 
and result in a limitation on destructive 
capability should armed hostilities none-
theless occur. 
Obviously, the Parties would need to 
decide and make clear in the agreement or 
in the negotiating record their intention 
as to the applicability of a possible 
future ASAT agreement during armed hos-
tilities. However, if space systems are 
available that are perceived to be capable 
of use to directly threaten significant 
military assets of either Party to such 
an agreement whether those assets be in 
space or on Earth, it is doubtful that the 
parties would be able to agree that the 
agreement applied during period of armed 
hostilities. Moreover, the existence of 
such systems could serve as a significant 
disincentive to even considering the pos-
sibility of negotiating an ASAT ban. 
Since it has already been concluded 
that existing international law protects 
space objects during peacetime and if a 
future ASAT agreement were not applicable 
during armed hostilities, what effect 
would such an agreement have? The answer 
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is that the agreement would seek to pro-
tect space objects to some extent during 
armed hostilities by denying the parties 
the opportunity to test and deploy certain 
or all dedicated ASAT weapon systems 
thereby denying the sides the assurance 
that systems they ~ay wish to use during 
armed hostilities would work. Some pro-
tection for satellites would result but 
there would be uncertainty as to what 
damage unproven or undedicated technology 
might be able to inflict upon satellites 
during hostilities. 
This uncertainty is reduced for a 
party that has proven technology and is 
increased for a party that has technology 
more or less under development. Present-
ly, the Soviet Union has a proven ASAT 
capability that can damage or destroy 
satellites in low Earth orbit. The U.S. 
is developing a direct ascent interceptor 
that is designed to damage or destroy 
satellites in low Earth orbit. It is 
possible that both could agree to destroy 
these systems but verification of compli-
ance would require very intrusive verifi-
cation measures. Even if this could be 
accomplished, there could be concern that 
the Soviet Union could quickly replicate 
its destroyed system with some confidence 
of the effectiveness of the replicated 
systems. Whether the Soviet Union would 
have the same concern regarding the U.S. 
ASAT system presumably would be deter-
mined by how much testing of the system 
had occurred before the systems were 
destroyed. Another approach might be to 
concentrate arms control attention on 
high altitude systems. 
Conclusion 
An ASAT arms control agreement is not 
a magic wand that will make satellites 
invulnerable to protection during times 
of armed hostilities. Any reasonable 
definition of ASAT weapon will leave 
uncontrolled some non-weapon uses with a 
residual ASAT capability. Verification of 
an ASAT arms control agreement poses 
problems that must be considered daunting. 
The disparity between current ASAT capa-
bilities of the United States and the 
Soviet Union adds a further element of 
complexity. 
Some may conclude from this presenta-
tion that the future prospects are bleak 
indeed. While it is unreasonable to 
conclude, as many suggest, that demili-
tarization of space or a ban on ASAT 
weaponry are panaceas, it is also unrea-
sonable to conclude that nothing useful 
can be done in the area of space arms 
control. However, it is important in 
looking at possible future steps to 
appreciate the complexity of the problem 
and to keep objectives realistic. 
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